Biruk Shewadeg^[1]Lecturer of Philosophy at Addis Ababa Science and Technology University and he is currently a PhD candidate at the Center for African and Asian Studies, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. He can be … Continue a ler

Abstract:

This paper makes a brief analysis of Somaliland’s uncommon path towards state building with the coming to an end of Siad Barre’s rule that resulted in the collapse of central state institutions. Social contract theorists and other state centric scholars often equate such absence of central state institutions with full-fledged chaos. The paper, with the help of analyzing intensive literature and deployment of discursive reasoning approach however challenges the Hobbesian notion of state of nature – marked by ‘a war of every man against everyman” which is thought to be a logical consequence with the lack of a Leviathan – a strong central state apparatus claiming the sole monopoly over violence against the Somaliland background. For it has effectively negotiated the customary institutions in its quest for an establishment of viable statehood, the Somaliland trajectory is indeed anomalous. It would have a lot to say against the Eurocentric theories and experiences pertaining particularly to statehood. Unlike Somalia republic in the south, a state overwhelmed by a continuous conflict, Somaliland with instrumentalizing the customary institutions as a building block, founded a rudimentary but functioning state structure. Since 1991 the Guurt – elders’ council, led consecutive conferences aimed at peace and state building. The Borama conference obtained a comparative relevance in the study for it has founded a hybrid, aka ‘beel’ system of governance with an effective synchronization of the customary institutions with the modern one. The system thereof, the paper further argues would explain the enigma of why Somaliland becomes a pocket of of security and stability devoid of formal recognition at the international level.

Keywords: Somaliland; Guurti; Beel.

Resumo:

O objectivo deste documento é analisar o caminho pouco comum da Somalilândia para a construção da paz. A queda do domínio de Siad Barre tinha resultado no colapso das instituições do Estado central em toda a Somália. Teoristas de contratos sociais como Hobbes e outros estudiosos do Estado centrados no Estado equacionam frequentemente essa ausência de instituições do Estado central com o caos total. O documento, com a ajuda de uma análise intensiva da literatura e de uma abordagem de raciocínio discursivo, desafia contudo tal noção Hobbesiana de estado da natureza – marcada por “uma guerra de todos os homens contra todos os homens” que se pensa ser uma consequência lógica com a falta de um Leviatã – um forte aparelho do estado central que reivindica o monopólio exclusivo da violência, com referência à experiência da Somalilândia. A presença de instituições habituais como o Guurti (conselho de anciãos) que está ancorado no sistema do clã, a Somalilândia escapou às tragédias de estado da natureza. Além disso, a sua negociação eficaz das instituições consuetudinárias com o aparelho de estado “moderno” tornou a sua viagem uma verdadeira anomalia. Teria muito a dizer contra as teorias e experiências eurocêntricas, particularmente no que diz respeito à construção da paz liberal e à condição de Estado. Ao contrário da República da Somália no sul, um Estado dominado por um conflito contínuo, a Somalilândia, com a instrumentalização das instituições consuetudinárias como um bloco de construção, conseguiu manter uma paz relativa, fundando uma estrutura estatal rudimentar mas funcional. Desde 1991, os Guurt lideraram consecutivas conferências destinadas à paz e à construção do Estado. A conferência de Boroma obteve uma relevância comparativa neste estudo por ter fundado um sistema de governação híbrido, também conhecido como “beel”, com uma sincronização eficaz das instituições consuetudinárias com a moderna. O seu sistema, argumenta o documento, explicaria o enigma da razão pela qual a Somalilândia se torna um bolso de segurança e estabilidade desprovido de reconhecimento formal a nível internacional.

Palavras-chave: Somalilândia; Guurti; Beel.

Resumen:

El propósito de este documento es analizar el camino inusual de Somalilandia hacia la consolidación de la paz. La caída del gobierno de Siad Barre había resultado en el colapso de las instituciones estatales centrales en toda Somalia. Los teóricos del contrato social como Hobbes y otros estudiosos del estado centrados en el estado a menudo equiparan esta ausencia de instituciones estatales centrales con el caos total. El documento, con la ayuda de una revisión intensiva de la literatura y un enfoque de razonamiento discursivo, sin embargo desafía tal noción hobbesiana del estado de naturaleza -marcado por “una guerra de todos los hombres contra todos los hombres” que se piensa que es una consecuencia lógica con la falta de un Leviatán, un fuerte aparato estatal central que reclama el monopolio exclusivo de la violencia, con referencia a la experiencia de Somalilandia. La presencia de instituciones consuetudinarias como el Guurti (consejo de ancianos) que está anclado en el sistema de clanes, Somalilandia ha escapado a las tragedias del estado de naturaleza. Además, su efectiva negociación de las instituciones consuetudinarias con el aparato estatal “moderno” hizo de su viaje una verdadera anomalía. Tendría mucho que decir en contra de las teorías y experiencias eurocéntricas, en particular con respecto a la construcción de la paz y la estatalidad liberales. A diferencia de la República de Somalia en el sur, un estado dominado por un conflicto continuo, Somalilandia, con la instrumentalización de las instituciones consuetudinarias como piedra angular, logró mantener una paz relativa, fundando una estructura estatal rudimentaria pero funcional. Desde 1991, Guurt ha liderado conferencias consecutivas dirigidas a la paz y la construcción del estado. La conferencia de Boroma ganó relevancia comparativa en este estudio por haber fundado un sistema de gobernanza híbrido, también conocido como “beel”, con una sincronización efectiva de las instituciones consuetudinarias con las modernas. Su sistema, argumenta el documento, explicaría el enigma de por qué Somalilandia se convierte en un foco de seguridad y estabilidad sin reconocimiento formal a nivel internacional.

Palabras clave: Somalilandia; Guurti; Beel.

Introduction

The Somali population within the boundaries of the internationally recognized Somali republic is roughly estimated around 15.89 million bordering Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (United Nations Population Fund – UNPF: 2020). It also formed one of the largest, if not the only largest homogenous ethnic blocks in Africa. Culture and ethnicity wise, Somali people belong to “Hamitic or Cushitic family of peoples” (Lewis, 1980). By virtue of sharing a common ancestry, values, language, tradition, and religion; the Somalis can be taken as a nation. Despite a consideration into one nation or one ethnic group, the Somalis however are characterized by a strong stratification along clan and sub-clans lines. Though, the apparent clan division and the lack of centralized authority are pertinent to the Somalis, it is crucial to underscore the unity of the Somalis to be sustained along the relative homogeneity of civil society rather than by a centralized state. The Somali have, as Bradbury holds “strong traditions of mediation, reconciliation and consensus-building alongside customary institutions of law and order” which even sustains today (Bradbury, 2008).

The pastoralist tradition has greatly shaped Somali society. The political, economic and social dependence on the clan system as well as the pervasiveness of Somali governance and law structures might not be seen in outside of the pastoralist tradition. Prior to the advent of colonialism in the late 19^th century, Somali people were not subjected to any form of centralized government throughout the majority of the territory. The clan system provided governance and protection normally attributed to a centralized government.

The colonial rule and its aftermath, Somalia experienced Western-type governance characterized by a centralized state that contributed to cumulative problems that would later manifest as war, separatist movements, border conflicts, and eventually the breakup of Somalia. The post-Siad Barre period, which was characterized by the absence of central-state institutions, represented a condition in which the people of Somalia had to fall back on their traditional system, which in reality “never ceased to exist” (Gundel, 2006: 9). The political and social affairs of the society resumed to be ruled as it always had throughout the history of the country, by customary law and order. Right after the end of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, the republic of Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence though not achieved recognition by the international community as an independent state.

Up to the present, Somaliland has been characterized by relative stability and rudimentary but functioning governmental institutions, and a hybrid democratic political system. The Somaliland process of local conflict resolution and state building has been diametrically opposite to the policy followed by the international community, and other Western oriented organizations in their many fruitless attempts to (re) build state in Somalia republic. While, the top-down approach, repeated again and again, has failed to provide viable governance in Somalia republic, the experience from Somaliland appear anomalous in that it says a lot to the character of present-day global affairs than about their own, largely home-made Somali institutions. This study wants to make a birds’ eye view of the Somaliland’s’ peace and state building trajectory and the role played by the customary institutions.

Demystifying the Concept of the Somali’s ‘Customary Institutions’

A well-articulated Somali socio-cultural and political set up requires a basic understanding of its clan-system. The ‘trinities’ of Somali social and political structures are Kinship (descent, also known as ‘tol’ in Somali), Contract (‘xeer’), and traditional authority (guurti – elder’s council).

The Kinship

The idea of kinship is embedded into two fundamental components, namely blood-affiliation and xeer. Blood-affiliation is “essentially a product of genealogical connections buttressed by a patrilineal system harking back to a real or invented common origin/ancestor” (Samatar, 1993). The Somali xeer governs the relationship between a particular dia-paying group or a specific clan or sub-clan.

Kinship divides Somalis in accordance with their ancestors which stand in agnatic (patrineal) lineage type – clan. Genealogies define belonging to certain clans. Clan groups share common ancestors by only one generation in the genealogical tree, clans are segmented into separate sub-clans and clan families, it also includes ‘dia’-paying group (Lewis, 1994; 2008). Such a classificatory schema made the clan-family to stand as the upper limit of clanship obtaining the highest point of political cleavage.

Thus, the supremacy associated to clan interests can compel Somalis to adopt whatever action viewed to be in the interest of their clan-family even if such action is detrimental to the others. This rigid loyalty to their respective clan-family shapes the relationships between Somali individuals and tethers their identity solely to their particular clan-family. In this sense, citizenship is not based on duties and responsibilities associated with being a citizen of Somalia but on the basis of belonging to a particular clan-family. Members of a particular clan family show pride in their membership of it and conserve and cherish the genealogies which record their affiliation. This clan family is further classified into constituent clans and primary lineage. Each Somali clan-family branches into several clans depending on its size. The clan in most case acts as a communal political unit. Below this level of division lies the dia-paying group; it is the most stable minimal political unit that the clansmen operate (Lewis, 1963).

The ‘Xeer’

Xeer is a Somali customary law involving “a socially constructed set of norms established to safeguard security and social justice for Somalis” (Fox, 1998: 13) and has widely recognized principles that focuses on the protection of individual rights and obligations to family and clan. The xeer practice is centuries old and is primarily based on unwritten agreements between various Somali clans. Its permanence is a result of the need for Somali clans to institute mechanisms that would help them manage, prevent, and resolve their many conflicts. Its function includes calling into effect the implicit values of agnation, and stand as contractual agreements entered at every level of segmentation. It establishes law, order, and rules concerning marriage, war and peace, sharing and use of resources, and agreements between clans. The contractual political agreements founded by the xeer are localized in the dia-paying (blood compensation) group which sets rules about the punishment of misconduct.

The principles of xeer serve as a legal underpinning for traditional Somali politics. Somali people used their traditional rules as “an informal contact by which Somali society settles its legal and political disputes” (Laitin & Samatar, 1987: 41). Its principles are obeyed by all clans as a means of customary dispute resolutions between clans and for paying blood compensation. It goes without saying that this traditional system worked well for these communities and protected their personal, community rights and properties. Over the course of centuries, xeer has been evolved and managed to survive against the backdrop of European influence.

The primary subject of the xeer agreements principally relates to collective defense and security and to political cohesion in general. xeer guarantees the rights all members of a clan community, particularly regarding their property and traditional rights. It entails a number of rights, duties and obligations that govern clan groups and is based on the collective responsibility of the clan. Negotiation, mediation and arbitration are the three mechanisms under the xeer through which conflicts are resolved. They are traditionally held under a tree, and all adult male members of the community are free to attend the meetings. The tradition has been honed over centuries to manage ‘pastoral anarchy’ in the pre-colonial, post-colonial, and the post- Siad Barre Somalia.

With the collapse of the central government and its legal institutions in 1991 which has weakened Western law, the xeer reclaimed its revitalization. These changes, from a xeer standpoint, are significant, as they mean the empowerment of the customary system and leadership. Since then, xeer has been and continues to remain the primary source of law and order in many parts of Somalia. The collapse of the central government in many respects marked a transition from Western law to xeer, and xeer remains the only viable source of justice that can be legitimately used to resolve disputes in Somalia.

The ‘Guurti’

The guurti represents an elders’ council providing a governing structure that acted as a means of enforcement of law and judicial decisions. These councils were also the decision making body within the non-hierarchical clan structure and it is through them that contractual agreements are made concerning everything from marriage practices to resource allocation, trade agreements, punishment for crimes and movement of the clans or sub-clans. It was through these ‘shir’ (conference) of the guurti that governing of the clan or sub-clan took place (Richards, 2008: 98).

During times of conflict, crisis, disagreement between clans, when law had to be enforced or when negotiations within or between the clans were needed, the guurti met as a part of the shir. The guurti are traditionally the highest political council in Somali society, comprising titled and non-titled clan elders selected for their knowledge and wisdom.

With power not essentially being exercised by a chief, decisions were made through consensus and often the guurti and the shir continued for months. These clan councils continue to function within Somali society, particular in the context of state collapse and in the lack of state institutions. In many areas of post-collapse Somalia, the clan system provides a structure for inter-clan relations and governance, for organizing and managing violence and for organizing trade “through shir and guurti” (Bradbury, 2008: 15). These clan and elder councils have also been instrumental in the establishment of peace and the establishment of a central government in the northern territory of Somaliland. Therefore, the guurti is the highly respected political rule in Somali clan system. It enforces the traditional legal system enacted by the xeer.

The aforementioned values and institutions are those that this study takes as the ‘customary’ in which they are operating to provide a modicum security and order for Somalis. This phenomenon of ‘governance without government^” (Menkhaus, 2006/07) makes Somalia somewhat less anarchic than it is commonly assumed. Faced with government collapse, Somalis have vigorously pursued such traditional institutions to provide themselves with essential services normally associated with security and order. While these customary institutions serve as a building block in the establishment of state institutions in Somaliland, it of course sustained public order without necessarily promoting state revival in Somalia republic as well. The interest in this study is however to investigate the role played by these customary institutions in the Somaliland’s quest for negotiating hybridity – modern state apparatus and the customary institutions.

Somaliland and an Effective Utilization of the ‘Customary Institutions’

In a milieu of the crisis and inter- clan ferocity Somalia republic, a self-proclaimed republic in the North West – Somaliland emerged as a relatively peaceful and functional polity in the past three decades. The majority of its people come from three main clan families – the Isaaq, Dir – primarily the Gadabursi and Issaq clans, and Daarood – specifically the Warsangeli and Dolbahante clans – of whom the Isaaq are the largest (Lewis, 2008).

Contrary to the faction ridden and unstable territory of Somalia republic, Somaliland, had restored a functioning government and maintained a considerable degree of political stability. But why? What is the enigma?

State re (building) in Somaliland cannot be seen in isolation from the role played by the customary institutions. The customary institutions and particularly the guurti, appeared vital in the post Siad Barre era of reconciliation, institutional building and conflict resolution in Somaliland. It was instrumental in the consecutive conferences in the immediate aftermath of Siad Barre’s rule with the view to restore relations between communities affected by the war, mediating and resolving conflicts between various post war factions, and building the institutional foundation of the state. The objectives of the conference varied in accordance with the tenacity of the time. Some were made for the reconciliatory purpose, others for resolving conflict, and some others again for synchronizing the above two simultaneously. Most of the conferences were held between the elders sitting under a shadow of a tree.

The guurti in contexts of lager conferences were perhaps assisted by advisors, professionals, politicians, military officers, businessmen, intellectuals and secretaries. A number conference and particularly the Borama conference determined the direction and the nature of the state. Indeed, the 1991 Burco conference was also crucial for the elders made a decision to end the union with former Italian Trust territory of Somalia and unilaterally declared Somaliland’s independent statehood. A brief glance at Borama conference is quite important for the purpose of understanding the indispensable role of the customary institutions.

The Borama Conference

The Borama conference, often referred to as “the height” of all the clan conferences and a times a ‘make or break event’ in the creation of the Somaliland republic, was held from January to May 1993. It was organized in the principal town of Borama – the town of Gadabursi clan, the elders insisted for the hybrid institutional framework of the state. The Gadabursi had helped to mediate in the conflict within the Issaq in 1992.

Borama provided a relatively secure environment away from Hargeisa, Burco, and Berbera where security was still flimsy. It was also a town of the non-Issaq, which gave non-Issaqs a relatively better role in shaping the future of Somaliland. It also substantiated the earlier attempts at inclusion in the formation of Somaliland.

The strength of the Borama Conference emanates from the fact that it was largely homegrown and principally sponsored by communities in Somaliland though modest support from external sources of Community Aid Abroad, the Mennonites, Life and Peace Institute, Somali communities abroad, and the French and US embassies in Djibouti; was secured (Graf, 2012: 1).

Peace-making is a long, painstaking process. The Borama conference was the culmination of earlier peace conferences at Sheikh and Hargeisa in 1992. It succeeded partly because time was allowed for issues to be thoroughly debated and for flashpoints to be dealt with on the way in order that consensus could be achieved. The conference basically had two agenda items: reconciliation and security; and state formation.

The Borama conference was pivotal where issues of representation and power sharing were settled via the institutionalisation of clans and the customary institutions into the system of governance. It endorsed the formal institutionalization of the national guurti as the upper house of the parliament and the highest organ of the state. The national guurti supervised the peaceful transfer of power from the SNM (Somali National Movement) administration to a civilian government led by Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal. The conference also produced an interim Peace Charter – based on the xeer until a constitution was promulgated (Kaplan, 2008: 148).

The conference is known for its establishment of a political system which became known as beel – fusion of indigenous forms of social and political organisations with modern institutions of government. It was described as a vigorous hybrid of Western form and traditional ingredients. It comprises an executive president – elected for five years, an independent judiciary and a bicameral parliament – an unelected upper House of Elders incorporating the guurti and a lower House of Representatives the members of which were nominated on a clan basis by an “electoral college of elders for a term of six years” (Berouck, 2009: 5).

Hybrid government / the beel System

The hybrid system of government recognised kinship as the raison d’etre of Somali society. The government essentially became a power-sharing coalition of Somaliland’s main clans. The structure aimed at nurturing popular participation in governance which might best define the essence of democracy devoid of necessarily encumbering Western connotation. Executives are assigned in accordance with maintaining clan balance. Seats, both in the upper and lower houses of parliament were proportionally allocated to clans as per the formula the SNM initiated.

Somaliland, instead of partaking democratic model of governance imposed from the outside, opted for synchronizing Western-style institutions of government with its own cultural substratum. An important feature of the beel system lays on its inclusiveness in terms of clan representation. This inclusion “was vital for the successful implementation of the modern” as it “established a peaceful environment in which a new form of governance could be introduced” (Richards, 2008: 148). It allowed for the Somali population to identify with the new state structure and to get accustomed to democratic governance, thus helping it to achieve greater cohesion. More importantly, the system granted Somaliland administration a popular legitimacy that Somalia’s former regimes lacked.

Critique of the Beel System

The beel system is generally ascribed for helping to preserve peace and build workable state in Somaliland. The system however has been also subjected to various criticisms. The criticism includes clan representation, women exclusion, the guurti replacement, undemocratic nature, and politicization of the guurti. A critique against the critic to some of the critics is also treated subsequently.

Complaints on clan representation

The beel system made selection of officials to the executive in compliance with clan balance. Seats for the upper and lower houses of parliament were proportionally allocated to clans as per the formula the SNM initiated. This seemed to have, as some would argue limited the development of a fully representative and effective democracy and to have given rise to the marginalization of some clans, creating a sense of alienation among members of those clans. The 1993 Borama Charter used the 1960 Council that made seats to be roughly allocated for the House of Representatives, even though it faced widespread disagreement. The major clans of Habar Awal, Habar Awal, Habar Jalo, Garhajis, Gadabursi, and Dhulbuhante secured ten parliamentary seats each, while the smaller clans retained less in accordance with the formula that the charter used. The Garhajis confederation comprising the Idagalle and the Habar Yunis felt uncomfortable by the arrangements of the Borama Conference, which captured the confederation as one clan rather than two. While losing the presidency to a member of the contending clan that they were in fight they believed they were also being slighted within the House of Representatives (Phillips, 2013).

Similarly, the newly formalised beel system perceived by the Harti clans (Dhulbuhante and Warsengeli) as a mechanism undermined their historical level of influence. They were considered second only to the Isaaq under British colonial rule, in terms of population and influence. However, the settlement at Borama gave vice presidency to a member of the Gadabursi clan, Parliamentary Speaker – the less prestigious position was allocated to the Dhulbuhante. Though the Harti clans approved the settlement thereof, the feeling being sidelined in an ‘independent’ Somaliland deepened remained intact (Berouck, 2009). The beel system also had been critiqued for its failure to consider the geographical location of the clans whereby clan representatives are selected disproportionately from one region. This eventually led to disenfranchisement of clan members settled outside. Accordingly, the Harti clan members located in ‘middle’ Somaliland tends to be favored in selection for office than the others.

Women Exclusion

Contrary to the constitutional provision that denounces any act of discrimination against women and guarantees multi-dimensional equality, there is, some argue the prevalence of structural male favoritism in areas of authority and power. Only men are traditionally entitled to lead and represent their clan in the guurti. The upper house exclusively comprises of the men.

The inherent patrilineal clan system made women to be excluded from representative politics, justified by the fact that they would be represented by their husband’s clan or that of her father. But, this representation is passive and hinders the active role of women in decision making. The word guurti itself connotes a male elder and this causes a threat to women’s participation.

The Challenge of guurti Replacement

The replacement of the guurti still remains a highly contentious issue. The constitution vaguely puts the laws that are supposed to guide this process. In dealing with replacement issue, Article 58 of the Constitution, for example, claims that the members of the House of Elders shall be elected in a manner to be determined by law. This law however has never come into reality. Contradictory constitutional provisions are observed with regard to whether the guurti ought to be replaced via ‘election’ or selection. The replacement today is made only through heredity unlike the commonly held presumption that when a guurti member dies, the replacement would be made by another elder who would belong to the same clan. The practice however is different that deceased member is replaced only through selecting a member of the same family – son or grandson.

The counter argument justifies the above allegations arguing that disputes would arise if the heredity procedure is not followed strictly. Thus, this will happen for the purpose of avoiding conflict with the families. Moreover, though the constitution claims the minimum age for guurti membership shall be 45 years; deceased members of the guurti are often replaced by individuals who are too young.

The major challenge that the upper house faces is that most of its founding members have passed away. Such a loss is presented as a factor accelerating the decline of the House’s potential. Furthermore, there has never been a mechanism through which their experiences could be documented, therefore they die with all the knowledge that they possess. This loss appeared something that the house cannot afford.

The challenge at hand now therefore, is how the current guurti can be refreshed. The guurti has never been elected. Whenever clan elder dies or retires, the seat will be claimed by one of his descendants. This, many feel, is perpetually undermining the legitimacy of the body.

Partly, the problem is found in the constitution as it failed to provide no direction on the replacement of the guurti. It only claims “the members of the House of Elders shall be elected in a manner to be determined by law. A law governing this decision has yet to be drafted.”

Undemocratic nature

Another critic on the guurti has been associated with its undemocratic character in making some of its key decisions. It has also been accused of aligning itself with the executive demands. Equivocally, the executive accuse the guurti as an anachronistic institution that reject policies even when it is useful to the wider public.

Moreover, contrary to what the constitution says, the guurti has remained in office for around three decades. The Constitution clearly stipulates that the House of Elders shall assume office only for six years starting from the date of its first meeting.

In addition to a continuous extension of its term in office, the guurti has also corroborated when the executive extended its term. However, the counter argument reads the corroboration of extending the term of the executive as a sacred act of saving and salvaging the country.

Politicisation of the Guurti

Formalisation of the role of a certain type of clan leader in Somaliland’s political system was made possible by the Borama conference. This included formalisation of their responsibilities beyond clan leaders’ ‘traditional’ functions as mediators and peacemakers (Lewis, 2010: 147). Such a mechanism ascended the guurti members to the forefronts of national political confrontations where they did not have natural reserves of social capital to draw from, and where they were often physically detached from the communities they were ostensibly representing. The politicisation of traditional positions altered the nature of their legitimacy and exposed them to charges of corruption and political self-preservation – something that successive presidents have exploited as a means of increasing their own power vis-à-vis the guurti. The guurti members have done little to nothing in subduing such criticism, on the contrary being keen to be seen acquiescent of patronage, recurrently extending their own term, and siding with the government of the day. The Borama conference represented the zenith of the political power of the guurti, but the tension between political authority derived from grassroots contexts and political authority derived from proximity to the apparatus of the ‘state’, has since undermined its moral authority. The upper house members are becoming political and/or are getting involved in politics. They pointed to the current chairman of the guurti who they said is a well-known politician who contested in a previous election.

Moreover, some of the guurti members have loyalties to various political parties. This would in turn allow politicians intervene in the functioning of the elders with a resultant effect of negatively impacting the credibility of the House. In the same vein there are comments among the respondents that some guurti members have been seen attending political rallies.

Critique of the Critics

While the aforementioned critics represent the limitation of the beel system, some of it, however need a critical appraisal as the critic itself could have a counter criticism. Of a particular significance is the critic on the undemocratic nature of the guurti, need to be subjected for a critical examination as the critic itself takes the liberal democracy for granted.

A counter critique against the undemocratic nature

Since its secession from Somalia in 1991, some considers the east-African nation of Somaliland as one of the “most democratic governments in eastern Africa” (Eubank, 2010: 1).

Yet defining democracy appeared elusive, its form of expressions remained controversial. Does democracy necessarily mean western democracy? Is there only a distinct model for every country, irrespective of its traditions and conditions? These are some notable questions worth considered to address democratic deficit in Africa.

If democracy is ultimately about popular sovereignty – the power of the people to elect their rulers and representatives, the response will be ‘no’ for the couple of questions thereof. There cannot be a lone best way for selecting, appointing, or electing the rulers and representatives. It all depends on the worldview of the people determined by their values, beliefs, and orientations embedded in their culture which define them and explain how they think and act. Forms of democracy have been influenced by culture. Negligence of such specificities and passive propagation of the western preponderance appears counterproductive. While universal elements of democracy in some of its deliberations are convincing, presenting liberal democracy as the political messiah to salvage Africa against its quagmires part of justifying the neocolonial enterprise.

The carrot and stick strategy employed against the Africans to emulate western liberal democracy in Africa eventually resulted in ‘demo-crazy’ rather. Alleviating such a challenge, therefore, requires a relentless effort to build democracy from within by fostering indigenous social and cultural practices. These African cultural practices should be kept alive, nurtured, encouraged, and spread in Africa.

The role of African traditional authorities and leaders against the effort to build democracy remained a matter of intense debate and contentions. It bifurcates between the ‘traditionalists’ – arguing that these institutions are vital to give local relevance for democracy, and the ‘modernists’ – portrays the institutions as intrinsically anti-democratic that should be abolished. ‘Romanticizers’ and ‘trivializers’ is alternative way that people depict the two positions. Beyond the dichotomies however, these institutions have proved to be quite resilient, and are not withering away at will, as some have suggested.

The lack of authenticity in part of the liberal democracy is a case in point for its failure to address the governance deficit in Africa. In different conditions, societies crafted different social tactics to their respective contradictions. This led to the existence of different notions of democracy in accordance with their peculiar forms of the state and civil society.

We can have lots of reasons why democracy seems not to be working in Africa. The reluctance to accept that democracy may vary from society to society and that by reason of this elasticity, democracy need not be practiced in strict adherence to those attributes that define it in its Western conception. The African problem with democratic practice can therefore possibly attributed to the fundamental delusion that it can be passively imported in a wholesale from one society and super imposed on the other irrespective of cultural differences. If democracy is to work in Africa, it has to be customized with the indigenous practices.

Claude Ake (1993) argues for an ‘African model’ of democracy where African traditions of political participation can duly be considered. However, as political systems in Africa take various forms, the road may not plain to build a single model that would serve the African mass in unanimity.

Kwasi Wiredu (1996) maintains that the political salvation in Africa may not be feasible unless a fundamental departure is made against the present model of majoritarian democracy. In many African states, the model therefore ascribed certain ethnic groups in perpetual power and others, consistently staged outside the corridor of power. This further undermines the fundamental human rights of decisional representation are permanently denied with impunity. Such practices against well representation become a persistent cause of political instability in Africa. Wiredu introduces the significance of a non-party and consensual democracy in curbing the multifaceted socio-political ills that majoritarian democracy brings to Africa:

A non-party and consensual democratic system is one in which parties are not the basis of power. People can form political associations to propagate their political ideas and help to elect representatives to parliament. But an association having the most elected members will not therefore be the governing group. Every representative will be of the government in his personal, rather than associational capacity (Wiredu, 1995:179).

Central to Wiredu’s argument is the necessity to ponder the individual’s personal views, prior to decisions to be made on the principle of consensus. This process of deliberation on issues rather than resorting to popular vote is according to Wiredu, capable of promoting mutual tolerance, thereby contributing to demarginalization in a polity.

In Somali society – a society famously described as a ‘pastoral democracy’ and influenced by Arab and African culture’ – traditional political institutions and practices have, been particularly pertinent to efforts to establish a liberal democracy in Somaliland.

Is the guurti less democratic just because it is not an elected body?

Interestingly, in Somaliland they have created a house of elders – the guurti – that is quite different from those operating in other African counties. Parliament cannot pass any laws that are not first approved by the guurti. Its members are not elected. They are selected representatives of every clan and are viewed as guardians of culture and religion. They are responsible for resolving conflicts in the country and have the power to regulate the executive.

Conclusion

When the Cold war was over, international interventions led by the ideological premises of liberal peacebuilding have increasingly been deployed to deal with internal conflict. As part of its peacebuilding effort, it has gone through enormous international support for rebuilding states in the conflict-prone areas. Its approach to peacebuilding, however, remained dominant for so long, it faced recurrent failure due to its inability to comprehend cultural nuances and idiosyncrasies.

Accordingly, peacebuilding efforts in Somalia have largely been dominated by the international intervention anchored on the ideological supremacy of liberal peacebuilding. As the grand international conferences of Artha and Mbaghati would suggest, the (re) building of central state institutions and the concomitant creation of safe havens for the realization of liberal doctrines, has been taken a panacea. Contrary to what is presumed, those attempts to the least appeared unsuccessful at other time become counterproductive.

A very different trajectory towards peace building has been observed in Somaliland. In the post-Siad Barre period, customary institutions in Somaliland were on guard to bear their traditional duty of reconciliation and peacemaking. As an institution primarily relying on traditional Somali customs it is vital that the government endure adherence to the traditional values that offer the guurti with its legitimacy perhaps with all its limitations and drawbacks. Primarily, the relative success in peace building and the apparent accomplishment in the establishment of a rudimentary but functioning state structure may not be seen in isolation from the role played by the guurti.

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